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This paper investigates the conditional demands of Death-Is-Different 
jurisprudence in the United States criminal justice system and argues 
that the dissonance between the need for heightened protections in 
capital sentencing and the reality of our capital-sentencing institutions 
ultimately renders the death penalty, as it currently exists in our society, 
impermissible. This claim is substantiated in three parts: first, through 
an analysis of foundational death penalty decisions from the Supreme 
Court, which condemn the arbitrary nature of capital juries while simul-
taneously justifying their constitutional necessity as sentencing agents; 
second, through an examination of the development of Death-Is-Dif-
ferent jurisprudence and its conceptual implications for the application 
of the death penalty; and finally, through an identification of the faults 
that render capital juries unable to meet the protective standard that 
America’s Death-Is-Different principle requires.
Introduction
Many proponents of the death penalty in the United States argue that, 
as a sentence, execution is qualitatively different from all other punish-
ments. That capital punishment requires an ethical, as opposed to a legal, 
judgment, and given the severity and finality of its consequence, punish-
ment by death is understood as intrinsically distinct. Thus, its sentencing 
demands heightened, and reliable, protections against error within the 
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criminal justice system. Acknowledging this principle in our death 
penalty jurisprudence undoubtedly eases anxiety about the persistence 
of capital punishment in the United States. Both the presence of court 
decisions that limit capital-sentencing procedures and the implementa-
tion of death-specific safeguards have produced an aura of rationality and 
regulation in modern capital sentencing. By nature, these mechanisms 
work to satisfy the foundational principle that the punishment of death 
must be treated differently than all other forms of punishment. Moreover, 
utilizing capital juries as the deciding agents in these existential decisions 
diffuses responsibility and gives the process “an immediate democratic 
appearance” (Abramson). 
However, despite such perceptions, the reality of death penalty law falls 
far below the standard of heightened reliability that capital-sentenc-
ing cases demand. Supreme Court decisions have resulted in procedural 
paradoxes, and the “seemingly intricate and demanding constraints [of 
death penalty safeguards] appear quite marginal” when inspected closely 
(Mandery 171-180). Additionally, systematic factors insulate capital 
jurors from the context needed to seriously and accurately represent the 
will of their community. Despite the notion that death should be different, 
it is evident that the protections in death cases are not as different as they 
appear to be. This asymmetry, between the appearance and the reality 
of death penalty law, has a disastrous effect. It creates an exaggerated 
assumption of fairness and rationality in capital sentencing, numbs 
actors within the criminal justice system, and degrades the effective-
ness and reliability of our capital jury system altogether. As a result of 
these factors, the faults embedded in the modern American death penalty 
prevent us from truly treating death as different, as required by philo-
sophical and legal logic. For this reason, our current application of capital 
punishment is impermissible and ought not be imposed until these sys-
tematic issues are resolved.
I will substantiate this claim by highlighting three things: first, the foun-
dational Supreme Court decisions involving the death penalty, which 
problematically demonstrate the arbitrary nature of capital juries as well 
as their constitutional necessity in death penalty cases; second, the legal 
development of Death-Is-Different jurisprudence and its conceptual 
implications for applications of the death penalty; and third, the faults 
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that render capital juries unable to meet the protective standard that 
America’s Death-Is-Different principle requires.
1. Foundational Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Through the examination of two foundational Supreme Court decisions, 
Furman v. Georgia and Ring v. Arizona, a paradox within death penalty 
jurisprudence becomes apparent: capital juries are a source of arbitrari-
ness in capital sentencing, but they are also considered constitutionally 
essential in capital trials.
The Effect of Furman
In 1972, the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia addressed 
concerns of arbitrariness inside the structure and application of death 
penalty statutes across the country. Citing the random and infrequent 
implementation of execution, five of the nine justices held that this 
arbitrary imposition of capital punishment violated the cruel and unusual 
clause of the Eighth Amendment (Hoeffel). The problem of arbitrariness 
stemmed from the uncontrolled discretion of capital sentencers. With no 
instructions or guidelines highlighting what to consider when deciding 
between life and death, pre-Furman capital jurors “capriciously selected 
[a] random handful” of petitioners to be sentenced to death in a manner 
that Justice Potter Stewart famously likened to being cruel and unusual in 
the way that being struck by lightning was cruel and unusual (Furman). 
This type of discretionary sentencing resulted in cases that were “pre-
dictably random at best, downright discriminatory at worst” (Abramson). 
So, the Court’s decision in Furman resulted in a type of de facto morato-
rium on death penalty imposition. Until states were able to modify their 
death penalty statutes to reduce the freakish and arbitrary nature of 
uncontrolled jury discretion, sentencing defendants to death violated the 
United States Constitution. 
Four years after Furman, through five concurrent Supreme Court 
decisions known as the July 2 Cases (Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, 
Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Roberts v. Louisiana), death 
penalty statutes began to be reinstated state by state. By exhibiting that 
they were able to attend to the issues in Furman and minimize the risk of 
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arbitrary sentences, three of the five states involved in the July 2 Cases 
received approval for their new state death penalty schemes. The sen-
tencing schemes in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek each “provided objective 
criteria to direct and limit the sentencing discretion” and “allowed the 
sentencer…to take into account the character and record of an individ-
ual defendant” (Gregg). These results reflect the influence of Furman on 
death penalty law. While sentencers still yielded discretionary power, 
rational standards were now necessary to determine when executions 
were permissible to impose. Additionally, attempts to more severely limit 
sentencer discretion (like in the mandatory death sentence schemes of 
Woodson and Roberts) were deemed too restrictive. Juries needed to retain 
the “constitutionally required opportunity to consider any mitigating 
factors” relating to the crime or the individual’s character (Roberts). In 
this counterintuitive way, Furman made strides to reduce arbitrary sen-
tencing while preserving the arbitrariness inherent in the sentencer’s 
right to use discretion to evaluate mitigating evidence.
The Effect of Ring
As important as it was to regulate how capital sentences were imposed, 
it was equally as important to determine by whom they were imposed. Of 
the five July 2 Cases that arose in response to the Furman ruling, only one 
proposed an option favoring a trial judge over a jury for capital sentenc-
ing (Proffitt). After Furman demonstrated the need for more consistent 
results, there was a legitimate question of which deciding authority 
would be most effective in constitutionally achieving them. In 2002, 
thirty years after Furman, the question was decided. In Ring v. Arizona, the 
Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant cannot 
be “exposed…to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if 
punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone” (Ring). 
This meant that Ring reserved to the jury the task of “fact-finding about 
the presence of aggravating circumstances” in a capital case (Abramson). 
However, Ring failed to specify which authority must do the actual sen-
tencing under the Eighth Amendment, a topic Justice Stephen Breyer 
touched on. Justice Breyer argued that the Eighth Amendment “requires 
States to apply special procedural safeguards when they seek the death 
penalty,” which includes the requirement that a jury be the agent in 
charge of imposing any death sentence (Ring). Justice Breyer’s justifi-
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cation for this claim was that jurors possess “an important comparative 
advantage over judges,” not because of any special fact-finding talent, 
but because they are “better suited to get the ethics of retribution right” 
in the realm of reliability and accuracy in capital sentences (Abramson). 
The “ethics of retribution” that Justice Breyer refers to is a principle 
rooted in “moral relativism when it comes to assessing the results of 
the sentencing phase” of capital cases (Abramson). Because of this, the 
qualities of reliability and accuracy that Justice Breyer emphasizes to 
justify the retributive authorization of capital punishment are relational, 
not absolute. This means that the scope of both characteristics ends at 
the conscience of the jurors’ community, as opposed to extending out 
into right and wrong principles of absolute morality. In Justice Breyer’s 
view, to be reliable, a capital sentence must reliably represent the moral 
sensibilities of this community, and to be accurate, a jury must make up a 
representative cross-section of the community to reflect its experiences 
as a whole. For these reasons, under Justice Breyer’s interpretation of 
Ring, and in order to provide the strongest safeguard in capital proce-
dures, only juries should have the power to sentence prisoners to death. 
With the necessity of a jury system from Ring as well as the establishment 
of juror discretion from Furman, these two opposing principles come head 
to head and fuel various problems in the American death penalty system.
2. The Concept That Death Is Different
The preceding paradox, of jury arbitrariness and jury necessity, becomes 
troublesome when faced with the threshold of heightened reliabil-
ity that our Death-Is-Different principle requires. Developed through 
death penalty jurisprudence and grounded in moral theory, the concept 
that death is intrinsically distinct from other punishments “has become 
an axiom of American law” (Rhetoric of Difference). This different 
nature of capital punishment is what proponents of the death penalty 
highlight as essential in our criminal justice system, and it is also why 
the Supreme Court held that cases involving capital punishment warrant 
special protections from error that non-capital cases do not. Ultimately, 
the Death-Is-Different principle implies that if our system is unable to 
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accommodate the level of protection that is demanded uniquely of death, 
execution must be categorized as an impermissible form of punishment.
Legal Development of Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence
The Death-Is-Different idea was first articulated by Justice William 
Brennan in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia. Unlike his con-
temporaries, Justice Brennan did not call for states to restructure their 
capital-sentencing statutes. Instead, he held that execution was uncon-
stitutional in all cases due to reasons that extended past its arbitrary 
application. Justice Brennan’s argument stemmed from the notion that 
because of its uniqueness, “death as punishment differs in kind, and 
not merely degree, from all other punishments” (Furman). Because of 
its severity and finality, capital punishment stands in a class of its own, 
incomparable to any other accepted form of punishment and “condemned 
as fatally offensive to human dignity” (Furman). Although the other 
justices did not agree with Justice Brennan’s call to categorically abolish 
the death penalty, the notion of human dignity that he put forth had 
lasting effects on death penalty jurisprudence moving forward.
The influence of Justice Brennan’s Death-Is-Different argument in 
Furman was apparent in the July 2 Cases four years later. In Gregg, Proffitt, 
and Jurek, the Supreme Court’s commitment to individualized sen-
tencing was rooted in protecting this intrinsic right of human dignity. 
Similarly, when the mandatory death penalty schemes in Woodson and 
Roberts were held as unconstitutional, “a plurality of the Court echoed 
Brennan’s Furman concurrence,” arguing that the qualitative difference 
of death called for a corresponding difference in procedural reliability. 
This meant that to protect human dignity, it was necessary to take special 
care to prevent erroneous convictions and ensure reliable and appropri-
ate sentences. In the Court’s 1978 decision in Lockett v. Ohio, the reach of 
the Death-Is-Different doctrine expanded even further as it broadened 
the scope of mitigating factors in capital cases. The Lockett decision held 
that capital jurors may not be precluded from considering any range of 
mitigating factors before imposing the penalty of death (Lockett). Even 
though this powerful expansion of sentencing discretion went against 
the Court’s objective of minimizing arbitrariness in capital sentenc-
ing, the uniqueness of execution made it necessary. This foundation of 
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Death-Is-Different jurisprudence demonstrated that the distinctness 
of execution was universally understood. Moreover, it exemplified the 
Court’s commitment to the heightened reliability that the doctrine 
demands.
Evolving Objectives of Death-Is-Difference Jurisprudence
This development in Death-Is-Different jurisprudence reflected an 
evolved conception of both the objective of capital sentencing and the 
underlying principles needed to make its practice just. Unlike non-cap-
ital cases where sentencers can rely on the word of the law to guide 
their judgments, “capital punishment rests on not a legal but an ethical 
judgment—an assessment of the “moral guilt” of the defendant” 
(Abramson). Because retribution, the primary justification for capital 
punishment, relies on a moral judgment, only an ethical determination 
can be the deciding factor of a defendant’s moral guilt in a capital case. So, 
when attempting to structure a systematic way to ensure capital juries are 
able to make these correct ethical judgments, the principles ingrained in 
the decision-making process can be extremely influential.
At the start of Death-Is-Different legal theory, the core principle that 
guided the Court’s action was the goal of achieving moral consistency. 
After Furman, the freakish and arbitrary nature of the American capi-
tal-sentencing system drove the majority opinion to demand revised 
state statutes that could provide more consistent results. Of the nine 
different Supreme Court opinions in the case, each citing their own 
interpretation of Furman, the most agreed-upon point was that capital 
sentencing desperately needed to be more morally consistent. This 
principle of moral consistency is present in Immanuel Kant’s influential 
“Right of Punishing” from The Metaphysics of Morals. In Kantian ethics, 
the objective is to consistently stay true to the act that was committed and 
respond only to that act and the intrinsic guilt within it. With the purpose 
of punishment deriving solely from retribution, this is “the only principle 
which in regulating a public court, as distinguished from mere private 
judgment, can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a just 
penalty” (Kant). By holding to this standard, punishments were ensured 
to be morally consistent. Extending this theory to the realm of capital 
punishment, Kantian ethics holds that capital punishment for murder 
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is morally obligated, not just permissible. Any lower sentence would be 
morally inconsistent with the crime and the guilt of the offender.
In the case of Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court responded to an 
attempt and a failure to apply this Kantian version of moral consistency 
to American capital sentencing. Following Furman’s call for discretionary 
consistency, North Carolina put forth a mandatory-sentencing scheme 
that would ensure consistent sentencing results by defining a narrow 
list of crimes that would categorically warrant execution. In deciding 
Woodson, a conflict between principles arose. By denying capital juries the 
right to exercise their decision-making power, “rigid consistency [was] 
in tension with fairness to a particular defendant,” and North Carolina 
seemed to place “the search for consistency above the merits of discre-
tion” and opt for securing aggregate consistency over individual fairness 
(Abramson). By striking down Woodson’s proposal, the Court decidedly 
departed from its goal of achieving moral consistency and took a visible 
step in the direction away from Kantian ethics. Woodson and the other 
1976 post-Furman decisions demonstrated, instead, a developing prior-
itization of protecting moral mercy over maintaining moral consistency. 
The July 2 Cases whose statutes were upheld by the Supreme Court col-
lectively demonstrated the developing value of moral mercy within 
Death-Is-Different jurisprudence. While the discretionary power of 
capital juries was limited by the requirement of identifying aggravat-
ing factors in order to impose the death penalty, the Court left absolute 
autonomy to the jurors to decide not to impose it. By reserving the right 
for capital juries to withhold imposing a capital sentence, even after iden-
tifying aggregating factors, the act of relying on leniency and mercy in 
order to justify not sentencing an individual to death became both per-
missible and fundamentally protected. Unlike Kant’s rigid interpretation 
of retributive justice, Gregg and its contemporaries “offered an elective 
notion of retribution,” where execution is only turned to as a last resort 
and after mitigation attempts fall short (Abramson). Lockett, perhaps, 
demonstrates an even greater expansion of this principle and a direct 
turnaround from the Court’s initial stance in Furman. The Court held under 
Lockett that states must leave the category of mitigating factors “infinite 
and undefined” (Abramson). This meant that any interference by the law 
to limit the discretion of sentencers not to impose the death penalty was 
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unconstitutional. In essence, only the uncontrolled discretion of jurors 
could accurately and reliably determine what information is relevant to 
the principle of mercy. It left the power completely up to the independent 
discretion of jurors to choose when to impose executions, and in effect, 
the Lockett decision made a one-hundred-and-eighty-degree turn away 
from the Court’s previous effort to constrain discretion and deliberation 
in capital sentencing.
The principle underlying Death-Is-Different jurisprudence that remains 
now is one that rests on a philosophy of moral contouring. Reminiscent 
of “what Aristotle called the difference between equity and justice,” the 
law (or legal justice) is presented in universal terms meant to apply to all 
cases of one particular issue (Abramson). However, Aristotle noted that 
“there are some things about which it is not possible to speak correctly in 
universal terms,” and the law’s attempt to make correct determinations 
about those non-universal things can fall short (Abramson). In these 
cases, fairness (or equity) is necessary to fix legal mistakes, a process that 
is only possible if we resist the urge to blindly adhere to the law. Due to 
these nuances, our evolved death penalty legal theory rests on the method 
of looking to the discretion of jurors to investigate the moral contours of 
particular situations. To amend the erring nature of rigid laws, we rely 
on sentencers and their sense of fairness to deliver reasonable decisions, 
even if that means acting out of pure mercy and nothing else.
3. The Failure of Capital Sentencing Juries
Throughout Part 1, it was established that juries cause arbitrariness 
but are nonetheless essential in capital cases. Throughout Part 2, the 
evolution of Death-Is-Different jurisprudence and its guiding principles 
were traced with a result that leaves us in a legal system that relies heavily 
on individual jurors to instill fairness into capital sentencing. From Part 
3, it will become evident that structural problems in our criminal justice 
system inhibit capital jurors from accurately and reliably doing the job 
they are tasked with. Below, I will evidence some of these problems by 
specifically highlighting: the process of death-qualifying jurors, the 
faulty nature of jury instructions, and the systematic factors that remove
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the sense of “ultimate responsibility” from capital jurors and insulate 
them from the gravity of their decision.
Death-Qualifying Jurors
The process of death-qualifying jurors in capital cases is perhaps the 
most blatant structural roadblock that inhibits our death penalty system 
from working the way it should. The jury is a crucial democratic institu-
tion that “represents the coalescence of a great diversity of community 
attitudes,” which are fundamental to the success of the criminal justice 
system (Mandery 392-398). Without a proper jury make-up, the full 
range of community opinions cannot be represented, and a fair tribunal 
is impossible to be achieved. The Supreme Court has held again and 
again that the exclusion of specific groups from jury make-up degrades 
the “meaningful community participation” that juries are supposed 
to provide. Yet, despite the Court’s deep commitment to this principle 
of diversity, the death-qualifying process in capital jury selection cuts 
directly against it. Especially in capital sentencing, where the stakes of 
the jury’s decision are the highest of all criminal proceedings, it is imper-
ative that the jury system functions properly. As Justice Breyer argued in 
Ring v. Arizona, juries hold a “constitutionally significant advantage” over 
other sentencers due to “the very composition or makeup of the jury as a 
‘representative cross-section’ of the community” (Abramson). However, 
the death-qualification process that capital juries go through changes 
this composition and, thus, removes the constitutionally significant 
advantage that juries supposedly hold.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court constrained the extent to 
which the make-up of capital juries could be modified to consist of jurors 
who looked favorably upon the death penalty, but it did not constrain 
pro-death-penalty selective jury modification to the fullest possible 
extent. The decision barred prosecutors from striking, with cause, jurors 
who “indicated they had conscientious scruples” against inflicting the 
death penalty but agreed they could put their oppositions aside if the case 
demanded it (Death Qualification). While this holding made strides to 
dilute the pro-death-penalty bias that death qualification creates, it still 
protects the categorical exclusion of another group of potential jurors: 
those who are not able to put their moral objections to the death penalty 
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aside if the case demands it. As identified and criticized in Justice William 
Douglas’s concurring opinion in Witherspoon, by permitting the elim-
ination of jurors who are unable to put aside their moral opposition to 
execution, the Court allows capital juries to be “drawn with [the] system-
atic and intentional exclusion of some qualified groups” (Witherspoon). 
However, eighteen years after Witherspoon, the Court reaffirmed their 
position in Lockhart v. McCree, maintaining that the exclusion of these 
jurors does not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights (Lockhart). 
This action, which solidified the overt exclusion of certain jurors, has 
three major disabling effects on capital juries: it makes them less rep-
resentative; it alters their overall perspective; and it makes them more 
prone to convictions.
The reduction in representation is the most obvious effect that the 
death-qualification process creates in capital juries. By excluding jurors 
who oppose capital punishment, certain groups of the population are 
systematically removed from the jury selection process. Within this 
excludable class, there is a “disproportionate number of blacks and 
women,” which already creates an imbalance where jury make-up is less 
of a fair cross-section of the community that it is supposed to be rep-
resenting (Mandery 388-392). Because of this biased selection process, 
the individuals who make it onto death-qualified juries hold collectively 
different perspectives than the jurors who make up regular mixed juries 
(who do not have to go through the death-qualifying process). 
Studies have shown that, on average, death-qualified jurors are “more 
likely to believe that a defendant’s failure to testify is indicative of his 
guilt, more hostile to the insanity defense, more mistrustful of defense 
attorneys, and less concerned about the danger of erroneous convictions” 
(Mandery 388-392). In an aggregate sense, the narrow, less-representa-
tive selection of people that makes up death-qualified juries has a strong 
pro-prosecution bias that can influence its interpretation of the evidence 
and deliberation process. Finally, death-qualified juries tend to be more 
prone to conviction. The Capital Jury Project conducted studies that found 
that juries selected for capital trials “tend to place more emphasis on 
aggravating factors and overlook or minimize mitigating factors…con-
cluding that jury selection itself yields a jury that is more likely to convict 
a defendant and to impose a death sentence than a jury that was not death 
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qualified” (Death Qualification). Just the process of death qualification 
has been shown to “predispose the jurors that survive it to believe that 
the defendant is guilty,” by simply focusing their attention on the death 
penalty before the guilt phase has begun (Mandery 388-392). Death-qual-
ified juries slant capital sentencing in favor of convictions and sentences 
of death, an effect that utterly undermines the fair nature of jury-based 
sentencing.
Ultimately, the process of death qualification persists because individuals 
argue that it is necessary to question potential jurors “in order to discover 
whether they will be able to follow the law in deciding what sentence to 
impose” (Death Qualification). However, demonstrated in the complexity 
of capital sentencing and the Death-Is-Different principle, the respon-
sibility of a capital juror is to make an ethical judgment, not a legal one. 
As our evolved Death-Is-Different jurisprudence has demonstrated, the 
rigidity of law can miss the mark, and we have no choice but to rely on 
the fairness and morality of jurors to “rectify the inevitable shortcomings 
of general legal rules” when it comes to deciding between something as 
monumental as life or death (Abramson).
Jury Instructions
Consistently unclear and misleading jury instructions also prevent capital 
juries from fulfilling the duty that our Death-Is-Different jurisprudence 
demands of them. Exercising moral discretion and determining when 
mercy is deserved are powers intentionally left to capital jurors through 
decades of Supreme Court decisions. However, interviews conducted 
across multiple states revealed that the wording of judicial instructions 
have misled “a substantial number of capital jurors” into misinterpreting 
the capital sentencing structure and the leniency that they are constitu-
tionally allowed to grant (Abramson). In 1998, the question of misleading 
jury instructions was brought to the Court in Buchanan v. Angelone. When 
striking down Buchanan’s case, Justice William Rehnquist argued that 
“there [was] not a reasonable likelihood” that the jurors interpreted the 
Virginia instruction to preclude the consideration of mitigating evidence, 
and the Court had no distinct obligation to instruct on mitigation 
(Buchanan). 
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However, two years later another case was brought to the Court, in 
which a capital jury explicitly expressed confusion over the same piece of 
instruction. Unsure if it was permissible for them to withhold imposing 
the death penalty despite the presence of an aggravating factor, the jury 
sent a note to the presiding judge plainly asking for a clarification on this 
foundational rule. The judge “simply redirected their attention to the 
wording,” as “the Constitution requires nothing more” of a judge than 
a repetition of the instruction in question (Abramson). Misleading jury 
instructions, the inaction of judges to provide clarification, and the resis-
tance of the Supreme Court to enforce clearer instructions all undermine 
the balance of the capital jury system. By allowing jury instructions to 
continually mislead jurors about their abilities, “the Court becomes 
unwilling to enforce any longer the core component of Death-Is-Differ-
ent jurisprudence,” which requires jurors to “exercise moral discretion 
and particularized justice” in capital sentencing (Abramson).
Removed Sense of Responsibility
Finally, there are systematic factors, existing as a result of flaws embedded 
in the American death penalty system, which degrade the critical sense of 
ultimate responsibility that capital jurors hold. Deciding between life and 
death is a tremendous burden, and, as such, it is a burden that is necessary 
to translate the gravity of the decision to the sentencer in any capital case. 
As demonstrated in Ring, the jury is the only agent truly able to combine 
the law with its own sense of fairness to determine which outcome is truly 
just in an individual case. Because it requires an ethical determination, 
and not a legal one, the decision of capital sentencers holds a weight that 
is in a class of its own in the criminal justice system. Clearly, the respon-
sibility given to capital jurors is significant, and it is imperative that they 
accept this responsibility and treat it as so.
In 1985, in Caldwell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court demonstrated the 
importance and fragility of the responsibility of capital jurors. During the 
sentencing hearing, the prosecutor asked the jurors not to view them-
selves as the final decider of the defendant’s fate and to instead place that 
burden on the Mississippi Supreme Court who would review the trial after 
a decision was made. The Supreme Court held this action by the prose-
cution as constitutionally impermissible, exhibiting a need to protect 
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the sense of responsibility instilled in capital jurors. Justice Thurgood 
Marshall demonstrated his “belief in the truth of the assumption that 
sentencers treat their power to determine the appropriateness of death 
as an awesome responsibility,” and he identified this truth as the reason 
sentencer discretion is indispensable to Death-Is-Different jurisprudence 
(Caldwell). By diluting the responsibility of the capital jury, “substantial 
unreliability as well as bias in the favor of death sentences” become very 
real threats within capital cases (FindLaw). The respect of juror respon-
sibility truly is the foundation that our death penalty institution has 
evolved to rely upon. Despite this, certain aspects of our implementation 
of capital punishment actively degrade the juror responsibility that the 
Court so fervently protected in Caldwell. Both the artificial perception 
of rationality instilled in the capital sentencing system and the distance 
between capital sentencers and the actual act of execution contribute to 
the dilution of this “awesome responsibility,” and ultimately hinder the 
reliability of the jury system.
American death penalty legal history is uniquely complex and shockingly 
ineffective. This inconsistency creates an outside perception of the system 
that differs drastically from the actual mechanics of it. From Furman and 
Gregg, and even until today, our jurisprudence has been complicated 
and contradictory, leaving us in an ambiguous moment regarding the 
realities of our death penalty system. Our strong legal emphasis on the 
Death-Is-Different principle of heightened reliability creates a “strong 
but false sense that levels of safeguards” work accurately to protect 
against “unjust and arbitrary executions” (Mandery 171-180). However, 
in practice, the requirement of heightened reliability “surfaces unpre-
dictably at the margins of state capital schemes” and seems to carry the 
arbitrary characteristics of pre-Furman executions (Mandery 171-180). 
Despite this inconsistency, the Court’s Death-Is-Different doctrine has 
been effective in instilling a sense of rationality in our seemingly irra-
tional system. The piles of ad hoc limitations that have been added onto 
death penalty legislation appear to legitimatize our system and exagger-
ate the general belief that it is justifiable regardless of whether or not it 
is in reality. Even for actors inside the system, this perception can guide 
their behavior. Due to the jurisprudence that claims to limit and control 
the discretion of sentencers, an artificial aura of regulation circles above 
Simone Unwalla
  Volume 14.2 | Spring 2019         55
the innately unregulated nature of making a moral judgment to take an 
individual’s life. This can result in an “empirical sense of belief in the 
normative justifiability of” the capital punishment system, making jurors 
more comfortable in their role as sentencer (Mandery 171-180). With 
greater comfort in their role, the anxiety related to imposing execution 
that jurors feel is lowered. Similar to how the prosecutor in Caldwell 
shirked some of the jury’s responsibility off onto the Appellate Courts, 
this perception of rationality takes some of the weight off of the decision 
of capital juries. In this way, the façade of regulation that our jurispru-
dence creates lessens the responsibility that jurors have to bear—and, 
consequently, their reliability as sentencer).
Last, and most striking, the distance between jurors and the actual 
execution of defendants numbs capital jurors from the reality of their 
actions and inherently diminishes the responsibility they feel when 
imposing execution. Since the last public execution of Rainey Bethea 
in 1909, private execution laws have strictly limited our perception, 
knowledge of, and attitudes toward the execution of criminals. From 
1909 until now, executions have moved from public spectacles to acts 
that are intentionally hidden from public view. The number of witnesses 
allowed at executions have been severely restricted, detailed newspaper 
reporting on executions has been criminalized, and many state laws have 
even restricted executions to certain hours at night that will minimize 
possible news reports on them. The justification for most of these reg-
ulations initially derived from the desire to rid society of the savageness 
that tended to accompany public executions. In order to “protect society’s 
sensibilities,” executions were made private and have become increas-
ingly distant from public view ever since (Bessler). However, the laws 
intended to insulate us from becoming morally corrupt have instead 
“removed the issue of capital punishment from public consciousness and 
made Americans apathetic toward executions” (Bessler).
This apathy has grown larger with time and, perhaps, is the reason that 
the death penalty persists in America despite being abolished in most 
other Western democracies. Moreover, this distant view of execution as 
something foreign and removed from reality undeniably affects the indi-
viduals sitting on capital juries. Even though we task capital jurors with 
making the ultimate decision of whether or not to end a person’s life, 
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after they deliver their verdict, they leave the courthouse without directly 
facing the consequence of their actions. For this reason, in John Bessler’s 
Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions in America, he calls for “jurors who 
sentence criminal defendants to death” to “pull the triggering switch at 
their executions” (Bessler). Bessler’s proposition is certainly radical, but 
if the distance between sentencing and actual execution had no effect on 
jurors, then his proposal should be much easier to agree to than it seems 
to be. 
The detachment of jurors from the enormity of their decisions and, thus, 
the gravity of their decisions is perhaps best highlighted by the Trolley 
Problem in ethical theory. The Trolley Problem presents a series of 
scenarios in which actors make choices that result in the saving or killing 
of bystanders due to a runaway trolley. The most famous version of the 
moral dilemma hinges on whether the actor should do nothing and allow 
the trolley to kill five bystanders on the main track or whether they should 
pull a lever to divert the trolley onto a side track that will kill only one 
bystander. However, a variation of the thought experiment substitutes 
pulling the lever with physically pushing one bystander onto the track 
to save the other five. Consequentially, there should not be a difference 
between pulling a lever or pushing someone, but there is. Likewise, in 
capital sentencing, there should not be a difference between the gravity of 
sentencing someone to death and the gravity of executing them yourself, 
but like the Trolley Problem, there is. This analogy demonstrates that 
somewhere within our capital-sentencing system, jurors have lost a 
part of the true responsibility that should accompany such an important 
decision. Requiring juries to have direct confrontation with executions 
(be that “pulling the trigger” or simply observing the act) would “inject 
some much needed accountability and personal responsibility” into 
capital sentencing (Bessler). Requiring jurors to watch the result of their 
sentencing does not make the act of execution worse; it just makes the 
“reality inescapable” (Bessler). If this confrontation is too demoralizing 
for jurors, then it only reasons that the monumental decision of taking 
that defendant’s life should not be reached. Because this is not the case 
in our capital-punishing system, the moral responsibility felt by jurors is 
obviously not symmetric to the moral gravity of their decisions.
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The process of death-qualifying jurors, the persistence of misleading 
jury instructions, and the removed sense of responsibility held by capital 
sentencers are all mechanisms that undermine the heightened protec-
tions within capital punishment sentencing that the Death-Is-Different 
doctrine demands. In three distinct ways, these mechanisms demon-
strate how capital juries are intrinsically flawed from their formation to 
the ultimate purpose. Importantly, these are not just one-off problems. 
Rather, they are systematic issues built into the structure of our death 
penalty sentencing and our criminal justice system.
Conclusion
It is evident that our death penalty system as it functions today is flawed. 
Foundational capital sentencing jurisprudence directly conflicts. Moral 
principles that should act as the grounding for our legal decisions have 
morphed over time. And, the democratic institution of capital juries has 
inherent flaws that prevent jurors from fulfilling their purpose. The con-
tradictions between Court decisions, legal principles, moral theories, and 
practical applications result in complicated problems with no apparent 
fix. Ultimately, it follows that using capital juries to impose the death 
penalty, even under heightened protections, does not result in a truly fair 
and just tribunal. Looking past all the noise and competing opinions sur-
rounding capital punishment, every side can agree that, as a punishment, 
death is different. This uniqueness requires special care that our criminal 
justice institution, as it functions today, is not providing. Rather than 
continuing to pile on ad hoc regulations and distance sentencers (and the 
public) from the reality of capital sentencing, the permissibility of the 
institution should be reconsidered. Execution is an incredibly powerful 
act and, under the right application, can feasibly have a place in criminal 
punishment. Nonetheless, applied in an unjust way, capital punishment 
provides no service to our nation and leaves us with a lack of legitimate 
retributive justice. For these reasons, it can no longer be used.
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